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Negotiated Partition of South Africa – An Idea and its
History (1920s–1980s)
Jakob Zollmann
WZB Berlin Social Science Center
ABSTRACT
This article analyses a number of academic and journalistic
proposals on the negotiated partition of South Africa
coming from different schools of thought, from within
South Africa and abroad, from the 1920s up to the late
1980s. These proposals of dividing South Africa into a
‘predominantly black’ and a ‘predominantly white’ state
were presented by their authors as an alternative to
apartheid and seen as a way out of the impasse created by
the unwillingness of the National Party to accept the one
man, one vote principle for a unitary state. The article
examines how the proposals gradually foresaw giving the
economically most relevant parts of the country to the
‘predominantly black state’. The article argues that this
debate also has to be seen in the context of the Cold War
where the partition of countries had been a means to pacify





Institute of Race Relations
Throughout the twentieth century, territorial reorganisation was a recurring
question in southern African politics. The ‘unification’ of the hitherto four
separate British colonies – the Cape Colony, Natal, the Transvaal Colony
and the Orange River Colony – into one ‘Union of South Africa’ in 1910 is
merely the best-known example of such reorganisation.1 Before World War
I rumours were rampant that Germany had designs to expand its colony,
German Southwest Africa (GSWA), into Angola and British Bechuanaland.
The Germans, in turn, accused the British in South Africa of annexation
schemes towards GSWA; with the South African invasion of GSWA in the
early days of World War I this turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy. After
the war, Prime Minister Jan Smuts (1870–1950) reinitiated plans to enlarge
the South African state northwards, but in the Southern Rhodesian
CONTACT Jakob Zollmann jakob.zollmann@wzb.eu
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is
properly cited.
1. L. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa 1902–1910 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960).
SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORICAL JOURNAL
https://doi.org/10.1080/02582473.2021.1909119
government referendum of 1922, the British-origin electorate rejected joining
the Union of South Africa.2
As African politics during the twentieth century has shown, the opposite
version of territorial reorganisation – namely partition of a country – was
also repeatedly seen by political power brokers as a feasible means for their poli-
ties. Separatist and secessionist movements and wars, such as Biafra in Nigeria,
Oromo in Ethiopia, or Katanga in Kongo/Zaire, are cases in point.3 The par-
tition of Sudan and South Sudan (2011) or Ethiopia and Eritrea (1994) even
shows that it is possible to challenge and break with the principle of uti possidetis
– the continuity of colonial boundaries4 – upheld throughout decolonisation,
leading to the creation under international law of recognised states.5
In South African politics, too, the idea of partitioning the state – beyond
accepting the independence of Namibia (1990), which was originally planned
to be incorporated into the state as ‘Fifth Province’6 – was ventured by various
political circles and academics. This article analyses not plans for expansion but
ideas for partitioning the territory of South Africa. Plans for a Greater South
Africa were a sign of self-confidence and spoke of a sense of grandeur and histori-
cal mission, as exemplified by ‘frontier philosophers’ like Jan Smuts.7 The idea, on
the other hand, for negotiated or ‘radical partition’, as the leader of the Progressive
Federal Party Frederik van Zyl Slabbert (1940–2010) called it,8 sprang from a
sense of crisis that was very different from academic and administrative plans
for ‘macro- and micro-segregation’ between South Africa’s ‘races’.9
The perceived impossibility of continually upholding white dominance over
the disenfranchised majority of Africans, or the notion that – given the (cul-
tural) heterogeneity of South Africa’s population – cohabitation would be
impossible under the one man, one vote principle, led not only politicians but
also scholars and journalists to develop proposals to divide or partition not
only ‘the races’ but the territory of South Africa. To make things clear from
2. R. Hyam, The Failure of South African Expansion 1908–1948 (London: Palgrave, 1972); R. Hyam and
P. Henshaw, The Lion and the Springbok: Britain and South Africa Since the Boer War (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003).
3. For ease of reference, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_active_separatist_movements_in_
Africa, accessed 1 September 2017.
4. See J.P. Quéneudec, ‘Remarques sur le règlement des conflits frontaliers en Afrique’, Revue Générale de
Droit International Public, 74 (1970), 70; S. Lallonde, ‘The Role of the Uti Possidetis Principle in the Resol-
ution of Maritime Boundary Disputes’, in C. Chinkin and F. Baetens, eds, Sovereignty, Statehood and State
Responsibility: Essays in Honour of James Crawford (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 255.
5. D.M. Ahmed, Boundaries and Secession in Africa and International Law: Challenging Uti Possidetis
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); B. Fagbayibo, ‘South Sudan, Uti Possidetis Rule
and the Future of Statehood in Africa’, AfricLaw, 26 April 2012, https://africlaw.com/2012/04/26/
south-sudan-uti-possidetis-rule-and-the-future-of-statehood-in-africa/, accessed 1 September 2017.
6. J. Silvester, ‘Forging the Fifth Province: Imaginative Geographies and Territorialities of Empire’,
Journal of Southern African Studies, 41, 3 (2015), 505–518.
7. B. Schwarz, The White Man’s World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
8. F. van Zyl Slabbert and D. Welsh, South Africa’s Options: Strategies for Sharing Power (London: Rex
Collings, 1979), 169; Albert Grundlingh, Slabbert: Man on a Mission (Johannesburg: Ball, 2021).
9. Christoph Marx, Christoph Marx, Trennung und Angst. Hendrik Verwoerd und die Gedankenwelt der
Apartheid (Berlin: DeGruyter 2020).
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the outset: The partitionist proposals discussed here were understood by their
authors as an alternative to the sort of ‘segregation’ or ‘partition’ as defined
and practised under apartheid policy. The latter was indeed officially ‘South
Africa’s Politics of Partition’, as journalist Patrick Laurence (1937–2011) sub-
titled his analysis of the political history of the Transkei ‘Bantustan’ in 1976.10
As one critic analysed in 1967:
[F]or those Africans not actually in the employment of Whites, apartheid calls for
macro-segregation, i.e., round-the-clock separation in totally distinct regions, namely
the Native Reserves, now in the process of restyling under the name of Bantustans.
Macro-segregation thus becomes synonymous with the government’s notion of total
territorial partition, accompanied, of course, by White political paramountcy, even
in the African areas.11
The ideological origins and the execution of apartheid and segregationist
plans have been widely researched and it has been shown that ‘segregation
[…] was part of a wider pattern of modernization of South African society.’12
Yet, in this ‘context of the formal elaboration of apartheid from the 1930s to
the 1950’, as well as later on,13 counter-discourses also evolved. One of the
issues debated in these counter-discourses about ‘alternatives’was the possibility
of ‘total separation’, ‘radical’, or ‘negotiated partition’. The history of this idea
has found relatively little attention amongst researchers, mostly by political
scientists.14 Yet, it is part of South Africa’s intellectual history, for it depicts a
‘development in South African political thought’,15 and needs to be seen in
the context of ‘racial ideologies of modern Afrikaner nationalism’ and its adver-
saries.16 Historian Saul Dubow bemoaned years ago that the ‘continuities and
discontinuities which marked the transition from segregation to apartheid
10. P. Laurence, The Transkei: South Africa’s Politics of Partition (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1976).
11. P. van den Berghe, South Africa: A Study in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967),
120.
12. P.B. Rich, Hope and Despair: English Speaking Intellectuals and South African Politics 1896–1976
(London: British Academic Press, 1993), 14.
13. S. Dubow, ‘Afrikaner Nationalism, Apartheid and the Conceptualization of “Race”,’ Journal of African
History, 33, 2 (1992), 209.
14. The most comprehensive account is by G. Maasdorp, ‘Forms of Partition’, in R.I. Rotberg and
J. Barratt, eds, Conflict and Compromise in South Africa (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1980), 107–
146; shorter overviews are provided in D. Geldenhuys, South Africa’s Black Homelands: Past Objectives,
Present Realities and Future Developments (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International
Affairs, 1981), 52–58; E. Lourens and H. Kotzé, ‘South Africa’s Non-unitary Political Alternatives’,
in A. Venter, ed., South African Government and Politics (Johannesburg: Southern Book Publishers,
1989), 298–300; A. Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1985), 31–46; D.L. Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided
Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 131–133.
15. N.J. Rhoodie, Apartheid and Racial Partnership in Southern Africa: A Sociological Comparison between
Separate Ethno-national Development in South Africa and Racial Partnership in the Former Federation
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, with Special Reference to the Principles and Motives Involved in these Policy
Systems (Pretoria: Academica, 1969), 359.
16. A. du Toit, ‘Captive to the Nationalist Paradigm: Prof. F.A. van Jaarsveld and the Historical Evidence
for the Afrikaner’s Ideas on his Calling and Mission’, South African Historical Journal, 16, 1 (1984), 79.
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remain undertheorised and poorly explained’.17 The political and academic
writings since the 1920s about a possible partition of South Africa into indepen-
dent states offer at least some explanations regarding these (dis)continuities, as
they underline counter-discourses and the active search for alternatives.
However, the ever-changing context of apartheid politics also explains – in
part – the changing argumentative focus of the debate. In these long-lasting
debates about ‘alternatives’ (amongst academics, journalists, and politicians) it
is important to note that contributions focusing on the possibility of partition,
starting in the 1920s, came from diverse schools of thought (from within South
Africa and abroad) across the political spectrum. The texts considered in this
article are chosen to indicate this wide political spectrum, thereby laying bare
divergent motives – from early forms of (in the parlance of C.R.D. Halisi
(1947–2013)) ‘black republicanism’18 to Afrikaner ‘realists’ who anticipated
the end of apartheid but were eager to ensure the ‘protection of cultural rights’.19
Early voices in favour of partition: a communist and a liberal tradition
Amongst Africans involved in politics who came of age in the decade after
Union, the influence of Garveyism or communism grew markedly. These
circles underlined that their more radical ideas, like claims for one man, one
vote, were not their last word.20 Indeed, ‘partition has been mooted […] since
the 1920s.’21 In the 1920s, Africans associated with the Marxist-oriented Indus-
trial and Commercial Workers’ Union made clear that they did ‘not necessarily
seek inclusion in a common society on the basis of equal citizenship. [African]
Rejectionism could be compatible with segregation,’ if the latter was a way to
more rights and possibly self-determination.22 Since 1928, the Communist
Party of South Africa (CPSA, founded in 1921) officially followed the ‘correct
slogan proposed by the Comintern [Communist International] calling for an
independent native South African republic as a stage towards a workers’ and
peasants’ republic with full, equal rights for all races’.23 However, this ‘idea
that black liberation had to be framed in terms of state-independence’ (at the
expense of ‘dreams of socialism’), as enforced by Comintern, was thoroughly
17. S. Dubow, review of Ivan Evans, Bureaucracy and Race: Native Administration in South Africa (Uni-
versity of California Press, 1997), Journal of Modern African Studies, 36, 3 (1998), 531.
18. C.R.D. Halisi, ‘From Liberation to Citizenship: Identity and Innovation in Black South African Political
Thought’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 39, 1 (1997), 61–85.
19. R. Omond, ‘South Africa’s Post-apartheid Constitution’, Third World Quarterly, 9, 2 (1987), 634.
20. An early analysis of the process is provided in A.P. Walshe, ‘The Origins of African Political Con-
sciousness in South Africa’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 7, 4 (1969), 583–610.
21. Maasdorp, ‘Forms of Partition’, 117.
22. S. Dubow, South Africa’s Struggle for Human Rights (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2012), 52.
23. Resolution on ‘The South African Question’ adopted by the Executive Committee of the Communist
International following the Sixth Comintern congress, 1928; in: S. Johns, ‘The Comintern, South Africa
and the Black Diaspora’, Review of Politics, 37, 2 (1975), 200.
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disliked by the South African party leadership.24 Yet, ‘CPSA’s [previous] class-
oriented program based upon the premise that blacks were to be treated primar-
ily as workers and not as peasants or components of a nation was rejected by the
outside authority of the Comintern and replaced by a new made-in-Moscow
program which demanded that particular attention be paid to national issues.’25
In 1931, the CPSA, now purged of almost all its previous leadership, and Comin-
tern’s Executive Committee in Moscow agreed to further strengthen this focus by
decreeing ‘the right of the Zulu, Basuto etc. nations to form their own Independent
Republics’.26 The plural of ‘Independent Republics’ – mirroring the nationalities
policies of the Soviet Union27 –was decisive here, since the CPSA argued for a par-
tition of the Union, which could later (re)unite, as expressed by Comintern’s
slogan: ‘For the voluntary uniting of the African nations [of South Africa or
beyond?] in a Federation of Independent Native Republics.’28 When recently
quoting these communist demands, historians Irina Filatova and Appolon David-
son sarcastically added: ‘Hendrik Verwoerd […] who was to propose something
similar thirty years later, would have been extremely surprised had he known
that the same idea had occurred to the leaders of the Comintern.’29
This thinking in terms of ‘Independent [black] Republics’ found its continu-
ation in the demands of Davidson Don Tengo Jabavu (1885–1959), the first
African academic at the University of Fort Hare and prominent liberal critic
of the Hertzog government’s segregation policies. He is generally considered
an ‘advocate of nonracialism’ who ‘espoused South African territorial national-
ism rather than black African nationalism’.30 Yet, he was equally aware of the
previous debates on the left and was looking for a response to the ‘sharply esca-
lated oppression of blacks’ following the re-election of J.B.M. Hertzog (1866–
1942).31 At the All-African Convention, held in 1935 in the (failed) hope to
halt discriminatory legislation,32 Jabavu declared: ‘Segregation and colour-
bars must go; alternatively we want a separate state of our own where we
shall rule ourselves freed from the present hypocritical position.’33 This alterna-
tive, however, was only his second best political choice. In the words of his
24. E. Johanningsmeier, ‘Communists and Black Freedom Movements in South Africa and the US: 1919–
1950’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 30, 1 (2004), 169.
25. Johns: ‘The Comintern’, 234.
26. I. Filatova and A. Davidson, ‘“We, the South African Bolsheviks”: The Russian Revolution and South
Africa’, Journal of Contemporary History, 52, 4 (2017), 953.
27. G. Simon, Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities in the Soviet Union: From Totalitarian Dic-
tatorship to Post-Stalinist Society (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991).
28. Filatova and Davidson, ‘We, the South African Bolsheviks’, 953.
29. Ibid.
30. C.R.D. Halisi, Black Political Thought in the Making of South African Democracy (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1999), 50.
31. Johanningsmeier, ‘Communists and Black Freedom Movements’, 169.
32. Halisi, Black Political Thought, 76–77.
33. Quoted in C.M. Tatz, Shadow and Substance in South Africa: A Study in Land and Franchise Policies
Affecting Africans, 1910–1960 (Durban: University of Natal Press, 1962), 88; see also D.D.T. Jabavu,
The Segregation Fallacy and Other Papers: A Native View of some South African Inter-Racial Problems
(Lovedale: Lovedale Institution Press, 1928), 46–47.
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biographer, Jabavu’s ‘worldview [was] shaped by the old Cape Colony ideal of
“equal rights for civilized men”,’ based on the hope for one ‘South African
state that embraced assimilation and rejected segregation’.34
Behind Jabavu’s claim for an altogether ‘alternative’ plan, ‘a separate state’,
was the notion in the 1930s that ‘land questions’ were increasingly blended
with ‘race questions’. The Hertzog government had promised to Africans
‘extended communal land rights in specific “reserved” areas’. It did so to
soothe African anger about the disenfranchising of Africans in the Cape. The
politics behind the segregationist legislation was thus based on the ‘assumption
that one kind of right [access to land] could be traded for another [voter’s
rights]’.35 However, Africans had made their own experience with the ‘reserved
areas’ since the inception of this system with the Native Land Act of 1913 that,
according to Jabavu in 1928, had for its ‘purpose […] to confine the black man
within such circumscribed limits that he should never be territorially indepen-
dent’.36 Hence his demand for ‘a separate state’, completely free from white
domination.
In 1939 the ‘German-English […] liberal European’37 Alfred Hoernlé
(1880–1943), professor of philosophy at the University of Witwatersrand
and since 1934 chairman of the South African Institute of Race Relations
(SAIRR), published his seminal South African Native Policy and the
Liberal Spirit. Here he openly denounced South Africa as ‘a dictatorship
of the White minority over the non-White majority’ and declared categori-
cally that ‘domination intended to be permanent […] is, in principle, irre-
concilable with the liberal spirit.’38 Already for the preceding 15-odd
years, Hoernlé had been a ‘trenchant critic of the segregation policy and
all its works’ as implemented by the Hertzog government.39 But he recog-
nised, like his fellow South African liberals, that he was ‘swimming
against a rough segregationist tide’.40 Thus, Hoernlé’s South African
Native Policy is seen as ‘indicative of […] pessimism or resignation’ reigning
amongst liberals.41 For a disillusioned Hoernlé, the segregated ‘multi-racial
34. C. Higgs, ‘Jabavu, Davidson Don Tengo’, in E.K. Akyeampong and H.L. Gates Jr., eds, Dictionary of
African Biography, Vol. 3 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 179.
35. Dubow, South Africa’s Struggle, 50.
36. Jabavu, The Segregation Fallacy, 11.
37. I.D. MacCrone, ‘R.F.A. Hoernlé – A Memoir’, in I.D. MacCrone, ed., Race and Reason (Johannesburg:
Witwatersrand University Press, 1945), xxiv.
38. A. Hoernlé, South African Native Policy and the Liberal Spirit (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand Univer-
sity Press, 1939), ix.
39. MacCrone, ‘R.F.A. Hoernlé – A Memoir’, xxiv.
40. R. Bernasconi, ‘The Paradox of Liberal Politics in the South African Context: Alfred Hoernlé’s Cri-
tique of Liberalism’s Pact with White Domination’, Critical Philosophy of Race, 4, 2 (2016),
172–173.
41. S. Dubow, ‘Introduction’, in S. Dubow and A. Jeeves, eds, South Africa’s 1940s: Worlds of Possibilities
(Cape Town: Double Storey, 2005), 7.
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society’ in South Africa, standing at odds with any liberal notion of equality
and justice, was ‘bound in the end to fail’.42
Consequently, South Africa’s ‘most outstanding English-speaking liberal
intellectual in the 1930s and early 1940s’ discussed the possibility of ‘total sep-
aration’ (as he called the option opposed to ‘thoroughgoing parallelism’ or ‘total
racial assimilation’) of South Africa’s ‘races’.43 Under the heading ‘Is a Liberal
Native Policy Possible?’ Hoernlé argued that ‘Total Separation’, given the
white rejection of legal equality for other races and common citizenship,
‘should be the liberal’s choice’.44 However, Hoernlé admitted that even
though ‘total separation’ ‘was ethically sound, [he] […] thought that whites
would refuse the enormous sacrifices that would be required to make it a
reality’.45 Also, the first commentators on Hoernlé’s ideas about how to
achieve liberty and equality for all South Africans noted his ‘confess[ion] that
he can give no confident answer’ to the ‘all-important question’ about the appli-
cability of his ideas.46
Historian of race and philosophy Robert Bernasconi has recently pointed
out that ‘there is still no consensus’ about the meaning of Hoernlé’s argu-
ments and in particular ‘about what this long-standing opponent of segre-
gation might have meant when he proposed “Total Separation”; even
though he did explain that by separation he understood “the organization
of different groups in several mutually independent, self-determining
societies”.’47 Later Hoernlé defined and distinguished: ‘Segregation […] is
most perfectly realized in a multi-racial caste-society. Separation, falsely
also called “segregation”, is most perfectly realized when the different racial
groups are sorted out into their own territorially distinct societies.’48 Was
this, in other words, an argument to divide the Union of South Africa into
two or more independent, internationally recognised sovereign states with
their own governments, capitals, and currencies? Indeed, already in 1936
Hoernlé had considered the possibility to ‘make segregation complete
[what he elsewhere called “the position of the double-minded segregationist
[…], setting free both Whites and Blacks from mutual dependence”], by the
establishment of economically and politically self-contained Native State’.49
42. R.F.A. Hoernlé, ‘Anatomy of Segregation (1936)’, in I.D. MacCrone, ed., Race and Reason (Johannes-
burg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1945), 108.
43. H. Giliomee, The Afrikaners: Biography of a People (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2003),
448.
44. Hoernlé, South African Native Policy, 181.
45. Giliomee, The Afrikaners, 473, referring to Hoernlé 1939, 149-168; see also Lijphart, Power-Sharing in
South Africa, 32; A. Nash, The Dialectical Tradition in South Africa (New York: Routledge, 2009), 65–
66.
46. MacCrone, ‘R.F.A. Hoernlé – A Memoir’, xxxv.
47. Bernasconi, ‘The Paradox of Liberal Politics’, 174, quoting Hoernlé 1945, 158.
48. R.F.A. Hoernlé, ‘Present-Day Trends in South African Race Relations (1941)’, in I.D. MacCrone, ed.,
Race and Reason (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1945), 160.
49. Hoernlé, ‘Anatomy of Segregation’, 108–109.
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Conversely, historians such as the Marxist Martin Legassick have suggested
that Hoernlé’s arguments were not based in this history of land use and segre-
gation but, rather, that they were to become, in the future, an important contri-
bution to the ‘formulation of apartheid’.50 This opinion, however, seems based
on an erroneous reading of Hoernlé’s definition of liberty and his quasi-teleo-
logical argument that ‘the spirit of liberty is ineradicable and cannot in the
end be denied’.51 Also, Hoernlé’s scathing criticism of South Africa’s ‘division’
into ‘Native Reserves’ and, as he added, ‘White Reserves’,52 his contempt for this
policy of ‘kraaling Blacks and Whites apart in territorially-separated areas’
whilst keeping up the economic entanglement between them, leaves little
room for making him an intellectual forerunner of National Party (NP) politics
in the years after his death.53 The usage of terms such as ‘separation’ or ‘Native
State’ did not make Hoernlé the intellectual ‘founding father’ of the pseudo-
independent homelands, such as the Transkei or Bophuthatswana.
Historian Paul B. Rich, on the other hand, pointed out that Hoernlé ‘recog-
nized – long before the creation of Homelands – that any artificially created
black state would be subject to white control’ and thus white lordship would
remain intact. However, Hoernlé ‘failed to offer any politically feasible solution’
and provided, so Rich, a ‘generally gloomy analysis of South African politics’.
And still, the argument for territorial separation ‘offered a model for the deco-
lonization of South African society before the advent of popular African
nationalism’.54
Yet, it appears that the alternative to the South African racial ‘caste society’,
as coined by Hoernlé, was more paradox and had a more complicated relation
to questions of its practical implementation. Hoernlé was well aware that his
critics called him a ‘pessimist’, to which he replied that he merely had ‘no use
for confidence based on illusion’.55 In the words of Bernasconi, ‘Hoernlé was
not advocating “Total Separation” in practice’ – he was not doing so for pol-
itical and ideological reasons: Hoernlé noted that there was no ‘will’ to
execute such plans and he ‘knew full well that no form of liberalism could
accept the measures [for example infringements of property rights and
freedom of movement] that would be necessary to implement the “Total Sep-
aration” liberalism called for’ when faced with the racial hierarchies executed
50. Legassick, quoted in Bernasconi, ‘The Paradox of Liberal Politics’, 174.
51. Hoernlé, South African Native Policy, 185.
52. Hoernlé, ‘Anatomy of Segregation’, 95.
53. Hoernlé, ‘Present-Day Trends’, 162.
54. Rich, Hope and Despair, 59, 55. On Hoernlé’s possible influence on apartheid thinking and Jack
Simons’ accusation that he contributed to the formulation of the idea by stressing the word ‘separation’
instead of ‘segregation’ – the former translating into Afrikaans as ‘apartheid’ (though ‘apartheid’ could
be better translated as ‘apartness’), see Rich, Hope and Despair, 63–65. On earlier uses of the term
‘apartheid’ by the Bond vir Rassestudie in 1936, see Dubow, ‘Afrikaner Nationalism’, 211; and
H. Giliomee, ‘The Making of the Apartheid Plan, 1929–1948’, Journal of Southern African Studies,
29 (2003), 373–392.
55. Hoernlé, ‘Present-Day Trends’, 145.
8 J. ZOLLMANN
in South Africa. Rather, he ‘seems to have been saying that he, as a White
liberal, could not advocate “Total Separation” because he could not advocate
the means necessary to bring it about, while at the same time inviting “the
Native peoples” to pursue this course’.56 Hoernlé, who had recognised the
‘colonial dimension to South African society’, did not believe in ‘ambulance
work’ of reformist assumptions; these were indeed illusions.57 After all, in
the final section of his book he did not shy away from pointing to the
agency and the ‘force’ of the ‘non-European majority’ that would be decisive
for the future of South Africa. It was nothing but blunt when Hoernlé pre-
dicted in 1939: ‘The caste-structure of South African society has no intrinsic
stability and permanence.’58
The repercussions of the Second World War in South African politics were
profound, as evidenced by the NP’s victory in 1948. And still: The rise of Afri-
kaner nationalism to state power did not preclude the existence of voices ema-
nating from the White minority in favour of coming to terms with African
aspirations for equality.59 The Second World War, as Shula Marks puts it,
was ‘an important factor in releasing left and liberal energies’ in South
Africa.60 Liberals ‘wanted government to accept that the process of racial inte-
gration, particularly in the cities, was irreversible’.61 Recalling his own child-
hood, historian Hermann Giliomee (*1938) mentions implicitly receiving a
‘message’, namely ‘that uncontested white domination would not last
forever’.62 Dubow underlines the concurrent development of competing
world views in this period, speaking of the 1940s ‘as a decade in which
several “new” South Africas were imagined’. And, thus, ‘in no sense […]
was the advent of apartheid preordained.’ Dubow identifies three lines of
political thought in the era: African nationalism, Afrikaner nationalism,
and a ‘liberal or social-democratic South Africanism’ that ‘overlapped to an
extent with African as well as Afrikaner nationalism’ – all with their distinct
hopes for the future.63
As an example of the latter – the ‘shifting middleground’64 – stands the poet
and language scholar N.P. vanWyk Louw (1906–1970), who was part of a liberal
tradition of Afrikaner thought. Shortly after the SecondWorldWar he argued in
56. Bernasconi, ‘The Paradox of Liberal Politics’, 175, 177.
57. Rich, Hope and Despair, 59, 62.
58. Hoernlé, South African Native Policy, 184.
59. H. Suzman and E. Kahn, eds,New Lines in Native Policy (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race
Relations, 1947).
60. S. Marks, ‘Afterword: Worlds of Impossibilities’, in S. Dubow and A. Jeeves, eds, South Africa’s 1940s:
Worlds of Possibilities (Cape Town: Double Storey, 2005), 267.
61. H. Giliomee, ‘Apartheid, Verligtheid, and Liberalism’, in J. Butler, R. Elphick, and D.J. Welsh, eds,
Democratic Liberalism in South Africa: Its History and Prospect (Middletown: Wesleyan University
Press, 1987), 363–383.
62. H. Giliomee, Historian: An Autobiography (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2016), 21.
63. Dubow, ‘Introduction’, 2.
64. Ibid.
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favour of recognising the national ambitions of all nations within South Africa.
The rejection of the notion of nationalism as an exclusive preserve for the Afri-
kaners led him to envisage ‘four white and four black separate states in southern
Africa’.65 But, as Giliomee adds, Louw, like Hoernlé, ‘left the whole question of
the actual division of land obscure’.66 Only in 1960 did Louwmake a ‘brief refer-
ence to the “two halves of this large country of ours” to which whites and blacks
had claims’.67 In this respect it should also be recalled that ‘few liberals in the
1940s accepted equal political rights for black and white.’68
It is hard to establish concrete links between the writings and opinion pieces
of a few academics, on the one hand, and politicians, on the other. In 1946,
Judge Henry Fagan (1889-1963), a former United Party cabinet minister, was
appointed by Prime Minister Smuts to head a Commission on the Native Laws
in order to investigate the issue of African urbanisation. Not unlike Hoernlé,
the commission under Fagan ‘outlined three theoretical options for South
Africa: total segregation (partition), which it called “utterly impracticable”;
equality (no racial discrimination), which it also rejected; and an “in-
between” one, which it endorsed’.69 Practically the commissioners thus rec-
ommended relaxing the influx control of Africans to urban areas in order to
stabilise the workforce. This made the Fagan report, according to researchers,
‘[a]rguably the most liberal official document produced in the segregation
era’.70 As a (negative) response to the Fagan report, in 1947 the NP’s Daniel
F. Malan (1874–1959) appointed a party commission headed by Paul Sauer
and charged it with drafting a report71 that would turn ‘apartheid into a com-
prehensive racial policy’.72 The Stellenbosch academics who were involved
argued in favour of a strict regulation of African migration to urban centres
and the restriction of political and social rights of Africans outside their so-
called ‘homelands’. They considered the suggested ‘in-between’ solution to
lead to ‘racial levelling’ if ‘race as a legitimate criterion’ was rejected. ‘Signifi-
cantly, the [Stellenbosch] declaration referred to a white and a black group,
each having its own territory. The idea of ten black ethnic groups each with
its own homeland was a later elaboration.’73 Evidently, these (quasi-
65. Giliomee The Afrikaners, 473.
66. Ibid.
67. ‘Dat ons vir twee soorte mense ‘n plek wil regmaak in twee helftes van hierdie groot land van ons’, H.P.
von Wyk Louw, ‘Voorwoord’, in D.P. Botha, Die opkomst van ons derde stand (Cape Town, 1960), viii,
translated in Giliomee, The Afrikaners, 473; see Giliomee, Historian, 34–35.
68. Marks, ‘Afterword’, 273.
69. Giliomee, The Afrikaners, 478, referring to UG 28-48 Report of the Native Law Commission; see
Dubow, ‘Introduction’, 10.
70. I. Evans, Bureaucracy and Race: Native Administration in South Africa (Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1997), 57. (cpt. Reviving the Department of Native Affairs)
71. P.O. Sauer, Verslag van die Kleurvraagstuk-Kommissie van die Herenigde Nasionale Party (Sauer
Report, 1948).
72. Giliomee, The Afrikaners, 476–479.
73. Ibid.
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)government commissions and their reports exposed cleavages and controver-
sies over the form of white dominance.74 For example, in 1948 Fagan wrote a
response on the NP’s policy of ‘total territorial segregation’:
If the attempt succeeds, well and good. If not, it will nevertheless be a preparatory step
[…] to bring the mentality of the public to maturity and to get people to acquiesce in a
policy which concedes the impossibility of territorial segregation and […] to find the
best way of adapting ourselves to what is possible.75
For the new Prime Minister, Daniel F. Malan, it was obvious that the white
minority would unilaterally decide on any borderlines to be drawn within the
country between black and white. Plans in this direction were under way.76 Not-
withstanding the implementation of apartheid by the authorities, the ‘period of
the 1950s proved to be a fertile one for liberal debate in South Africa’.77 Whilst
in this liberal context some exchanged opinions about the legitimacy of parti-
tionist proposals, others argued not only about the ‘impossibility of territorial
segregation’78 but, most of all, refused to see its necessity for a future South
Africa. The Multi-Racial Conference of 1957 at the University of the Witwaters-
rand is an example in this respect. Under the auspices of church ministers, the
conference ‘tried to define the nature of economic, social and political duties in a
“common society” and was hailed by some observers as being one of the most
representative gatherings ever held in South Africa’.79 In 1959, the lawyer and
liberal Cape politician Donald Molteno (1908–1972) declared ‘Hoernlé’s three
a priori theoretical objectives of parallelism, assimilation, and separation as
being of marginal use, since even Hoernlé had recognized that they were politi-
cally impracticable’. Rather, Molteno hoped to develop feasible and democratic
alternatives by asking why Hoernlé’s objectives were impracticable. Thus, whilst
Molteno argued and hoped for ‘piecemeal reforms’ in order to liberalise the
system, this was exactly what Hoernlé rejected to accept as a feasible solution
for South Africa’s ‘race relations’.80
Arguments for and against partition in the face of Bantustans
Others in South Africa and beyond continued to weigh the advantages and disad-
vantages of partitioning South Africa. They did so in light of the ongoing
implementation of ‘Bantustans’, such as the Transkei, following the introduction
74. A. Ashforth, The Politics of Official Discourse in Twentieth-Century South Africa (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1990), 135–136.
75. Fagan, quoted in Giliomee, The Afrikaners, 498.
76. S. Dubow, Apartheid, 1948–1994 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); S. Dubow, Racial Segre-
gation and the Origins of Apartheid in South Africa, 1919–36 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989).
77. Rich, Hope and Despair, 91.
78. Ibid.
79. Rich, Hope and Despair, 93.
80. Rich, Hope and Despair, 64.
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of the South African Bantu Authorities Act in 1951. Furthermore, starting in 1955
the South African authorities began to implement the much discussed ‘Eiselen
line’, named after the anthropologist and Secretary for Native Affairs Werner
Willi Max Eiselen (1899–1977). Through influx control legislation this geographi-
cal line partitioned South Africa for black Africans into two territories, as the gov-
ernment designated the Western parts of the Cape province as the so-called
Coloured Labor Preference Area. Black Africans were refused to reside perma-
nently to the west of this line and were not to be given work there unless there
was no coloured person able to do it. The Eiselen policy became synonymous
with the forceful mass removal of black Africans to the ‘Bantustans’ further to
the east of the line.81 NP leaders themselves were, however, unclear about the ulti-
mate goal of such a policy. This lack of clarity included the question whether the
implementation of ‘total apartheid’ would result (in the distant future) in Africans
being ‘given political independence in their own areas’. For the time being, these
politicians preferred the customary patriarchal language of ‘guardianship’ and
‘trusteeship’ with regard to African ‘self-government’.82 Amongst African opposi-
tion circles, led by the African National Congress (ANC), on the other hand, the
‘Leninist principle of “democratic centralism” was rapidly gaining ground’.83
It was in this adversarial Cold War context that, beginning in the late 1950s, a
steady flow of publications aimed at laying out apartheid policies. They justified
these policies or proved themwrong, in particular from a theological, legal, histori-
cal, or economic point of view. Famously, parliamentarian Helen Suzman (1917–
2009), of theProgressiveParty, laid bare the ‘anomalies’ and inconsistencies of ‘race
classification’ andother perversions of the idea of the rule of law;84 others described
the economic problems through increased inequality as caused by apartheid econ-
omics; even historians ‘warn[ed] contemporary Afrikaner cultural leaders that
viewing the Afrikaner people as a chosen people with inter alia an apartheid’s
mission was basically wrong’.85 And the most vocal critics analysed ‘the drift
towards Fascism of the white government of the South African Republic’.86
81. A.J. Christopher, Atlas of a Changing South Africa (London: Routledge, 2001), 121; M. West, ‘From
Pass Courts to Deportation: Changing Patterns of Influx Control in Cape Town’, African Affairs, 81,
325 (1982), 463–477.
82. Tatz, Shadow and Substance in South Africa, 156–157.
83. Dubow, South Africa’s Struggle, 74; see Filatova and Davidson, ‘“We, the South African Bolsheviks”,’ 955.
84. H. Suzman, Race Classification and Definition in the Legislation of the Union of South Africa 1910–1960:
A Survey and Analysis (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1960), 1; see J. Dugard,
Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 59–60;
Dubow, South Africa’s Struggle, 79.
85. F.A. van Jaarsveld, ‘André du Toit: Much Ado About Nothing’, South African Historical Journal, 16, 1
(1984), 81, on the aim of his own paper ‘Die Afrikaner se idees oor uitverkorenheid, geroepenheid en
bestimming’ (1959/61).
86. B. Bunting and R. Segal, The Rise of the South African Reich (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964); see
Dubow, Apartheid, 282. On South Africa historiography, see C. Marx, Oxwagon Sentinel: Radical Afri-
kaner Nationalism and the History of the Ossewabrandwag (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2008), 4–11; F.A. van
Jaarsveld, ‘Recent Afrikaner Historiography’, Itinerario, 16, 1 (1992), 93–106. The centre-right journalist
John Mander warned already in 1963 that ‘comparisons with Nazi Germany do more harm than good.’
J. Mander, ‘South Africa: Revolution or Partition’, Encounter, 21, 4 (1963), 11.
12 J. ZOLLMANN
Academics, journalists, and others likewise weighted the chances for alterna-
tives, also based on – as one contemporary put it – a ‘growing awareness among
whites that their [dominant] position cannot be maintained indefinitely’.87
Leaders of the World Council of Churches, including some South African theo-
logians, at the South African Cottesloe convention (1960) expressed their con-
viction: ‘The segregation of racial groups […] involving discrimination leads to
hardship for members of the groups affected,’88 a claim that was subsequently
rejected by the Dutch Reformed Church. In the aftermath of the ‘traumatic con-
junction of Sharpeville [1960] and the final moves to bring about the Repub-
lic’,89 these alternatives were searched for (internationally) with an increased
sense of urgency.90 Evidently, ‘an alternative racial policy acceptable to the
majority of whites and non-whites alike has not been formulated’ in the
1960s,91 but with regard to ideas about subdividing or partitioning South
Africa, a number of titles shall be summarised hereunder.
Denis V Cowen (1918-2007), professor of comparative law and dean of law at
the University of Cape Town, in his Constitution-Making for a Democracy
(1960), explicitly searched for An Alternative to Apartheid (the sub-title of his
work) by drawing-up a ‘new constitution’. Without mentioning Hoernlé, he
argued: ‘If apartheid could measure up to an ideal […] of fair territorial partition
with real autonomy for each territory and full rights of each race, it is […] a sol-
ution which could be morally justified, calling for the greatest self-sacrifice.’ Yet,
given the difficulties of defining the meaning of ‘fair’ (‘Where exactly should the
boundaries be drawn?’), Cowen thought that this plan had no real prospects.
Apartheid thus remained ‘a wrong policy, one of despair’. Cowen rather
argued in favour of a ‘territorial federation’ and proposed the possibility of a
‘racial federation’ with constitutionally guaranteed rights for minorities.92 A
couple of months later, however, in October 1960, the economist Johannes de
Villiers Graaff (1928–2015) published an article in the Cape Argus newspaper
in which the subject of ‘partition’ of South Africa re-emerged ‘as a possible sol-
ution’ to end apartheid. Graaf argued for a negotiated partition of the country
87. D.V. Cowen, The Foundations of Freedom – with Special Reference to Southern Africa (Cape Town:
Oxford University Press, 1961), 69.
88. The Cottesloe Convention, part II no. 9, http://kerkargief.co.za/doks/bely/DF_Cottesloe.pdf, accessed
14 February 2018.
89. Du Toit, ‘Captive to the Nationalist Paradigm’, 52.
90. See, for example, B.B. Keet, Suid-Afrika Waarheen? (Stellenbosch: University Publishers, 1956); C.W.
de Kiewiet, The Anatomy of South African Misery (London: Oxford University Press, 1956); B.B. Keet,
‘The Bell has Already Tolled’, in B.B. Keet, ed., Delayed Action: An Ecumenical Witness from the Afri-
kaans-Speaking Church (Pretoria: N.G. Boekhandel, 1961), 5–12; A.B. du Preez, Inside the South
African Crucible (Cape Town: HAUM, 1959; N.J. Rhoodie and H.J. Venter, Apartheid: A Socio-Histori-
cal Exposition of the Origin and Development of the Apartheid Idea (Cape Town: HAUM, 1960); L.E.
Neame, AHistory of Apartheid: The Story of the Colour War in South Africa (New York: London House
and Maxwell, 1963); Jordan K. Ngubane, An African Explains Apartheid (New York: Praeger, 1963).
91. E.A. Tiryakian, ‘Apartheid and Politics in South Africa’, Journal of Politics, 22, 4 (1960), 696.
92. D.V. Cowen, Constitution-Making for a Democracy: An Alternative to Apartheid (Johannesburg: Anglo
American Corporation of South Africa, 1960), 5, 33–37.
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into two states: the east was to be inhabited mainly by Africans, the west mainly
by Whites. Remaining vague on the future borderline, he was nevertheless quite
open in his intention to keep the eastern state rather small, including Natal and
parts of Transvaal, excluding the gold and diamond mines. This border was to
be secured ‘internationally’, that is by troops of the United Nations. Graaff esti-
mated that no negative economic effects should be expected in Southern Africa
from this plan.93
Soon after this publication Graaff found a veritable opponent in Cowen, who
in his book The Foundations of Freedom (1961) discussed critically Graaf’s ‘poss-
ible solution’. Cowen characterised the ‘partition’ plan not only as unrealistic
and conflict-prone but also as a confession of ‘abject failure’ of the South
African society in the assumption that ‘whites and non-whites simply cannot
live together in peace’. Cowen was rather intent to convince his reader of the
political and constitutional necessity for a ‘fresh start’ in South Africa, namely
a federation. This was preferable to apartheid, civil war, or the ‘ultimate
resort of partition’, which, Cowen argued, would have to be ‘far more favourable
to the Africans’ to be acceptable (‘The whites might be lucky to keep theWestern
Province’) and which, for him, was rather a ‘strategic withdrawal, a shortening
of the lines of defence’.94
The economist F.P. Spooner, a one-time economic adviser to the govern-
ment, argued in the South African Predicament (1960) for the ‘survival of
White influence and leadership [in South Africa] – for without such influence
the country will surely decline’.95 However, having emphasised his Afrikaner-
British origins, he rejected the NP’s Bantustan policy and apartheid. Long
before international observers predicted that ‘apartheid would prove economi-
cally unsustainable’,96 Spooner characterised this ideology as ‘a one-way street
leading to the collapse of the country’s economy’. Given the impoverishment
of the African majority in times of an unprecedented boom, Spooner rather
hoped for a generally improved development of the wider region of southern
Africa and insisted on a more equitable sharing of economic gains with South
Africa’s non-white majority. Having predicted that apartheid will result in
‘the downfall of the Whites in the Union’, he found that apartheid could
‘succeed’ in ‘one sense only’, namely ‘partition, where the white and the non-
whites are given full control of their respective areas, after an equitable division
of the country’. With a view to the practicability of such plans, Spooner admitted
that ‘boundaries would be hard to define; it would also inevitably entail
immense hardship’.97
93. Jan Graaff, Cape Argus, 15 October 1960.
94. Cowen, The Foundations of Freedom, 70–71; 159–160.
95. F.P. Spooner, South African Predicament: The Economics of Apartheid (London: Jonathan Cape, 1960),
234.
96. Dubow, Apartheid, 285, referring to Michael O’Dowd, 1974.
97. Spooner, South African Predicament, 131–132.
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Franco-Austrian journalist Paul Giniewski (1926–2011), in his book Bantu-
stans: A Trek Towards the Future (1961), undertook to analyse, with an unmis-
takable colonialist undertone, the original idea of Bantustans in a more positive
light; but, importantly, he also questioned whether the government was actually
doing what it preached. Accepting the official view of distinct ‘nations’ within
South Africa, Giniewski argued in favour of a ‘regrouping of territory’ along
national lines. He considered that the ‘solution by partition is the only realistic
and moral one […]. Partition is the answer for human groups whose sentimen-
tal and therefore irrational aspirations diverge.’ Like other critics of the ‘Bantu
policy’, he was certain: ‘[N]othing except complete political emancipation will
satisfy [the Africans]’, and therefore he demanded the ‘“creative withdrawal”
of the Whites from the Black territories’. Giniewski accepted the idea of
several unrelated territories (yet seven, more encompassing areas than those
scheduled by the South African administration) and saw them bound in a
‘Bantu federation’ of independent states, including British-administered Basuto-
land, Swaziland, and Bechuanaland. Regarding the ‘frontiers of a partitioned
South Africa’, he wanted them ‘generous’ in favour of the new African states
and predicted a ‘Bantu horseshoe’ reaching from East London to Kuruman
and the borders with Southern Rhodesia and Mozambique.98 As a contempor-
ary critic assumed, this plan ‘would be rejected by urban African leaders as it
would “Balkanize” South Africa into perpetually weak economic states’.99 A
similar critique of the Bantustans ‘as a form of “balkanization”’ can still be
found in the most-recent historiography.100
However, it is important to recall that some Western observers were open to
see South Africa’s ‘homelands’ and, in particular, the development of the Trans-
kei, ‘the flagship of its homelands policy’, as a first step towards the ‘decoloniza-
tion’ of South Africa. ‘The Guardian accepted the principle of separate, viable
white and black spheres of influence, leading ultimately to full partition.’101
The Belgian-American sociologist Pierre L. van den Berghe (1933-2019), in
his influential South Africa, a Study in Conflict (1965), an angry analysis of
the flaws and injustices of apartheid policies and ideology, made sure to lay
out that the Bantustans had nothing to do with an ‘equitable geographical par-
tition’ between ethnic groups – despite all official propaganda. It was not only a
fact that Whites kept 87 per cent of South African territory for themselves but
the talk of ‘independent Bantustans’ was also a sham.102 Van den Berghe quoted
future prime minister Hendrik Verwoerd (1901–1966) who, in 1951, felt obliged
98. Paul Giniewski, Bantustans: A Trek towards the Future (Cape Town: Human & Rousseau, 1961), 8, 14,
178, 223 [French orig., Un faux problème colonial: L’Afrique du Sud (1961)].
99. E.A. Tiryakian, ‘Sociological Realism: Partition for South Africa?’, Social Forces, 46, 2 (1967), 214 n. 25.
100. Dubow, Apartheid, 112.
101. Giliomee, The Afrikaners, 532.
102. P.L. van den Berghe, South Africa, a Study in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965;
repr. 1970), 125.
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to mitigate worries in parliament that the ‘self-governing Native areas would be
sovereign’. Verwoerd underlined: ‘We cannot mean that we intend […] to cut
large slices out of South Africa and turn them into independent States.’103
With a sense of sarcasm van den Berghe described ‘equal partition’ as ‘“ideal”
apartheid’ that ‘the government has never seriously envisaged’ to implement
since this ‘would entail the political and economic disruption of the entire
country’.104 Van den Berghe was also eager to include the perspective of the
African majority on any partitionist proposals: ‘[M]ost politically conscious
Africans are against any territorial partition along ethnic lines and will not
settle for anything less than control over the entire country.’ Most ‘[n]on-
White leaders’, he argued, ‘envisage various forms of a multiracial country
within present frontiers.’105
Also the SAIRR, in the meantime the nation’s undisputed pedestal of liberal-
ism,106 kept an eye open towards the solution of partition. The institute’s presi-
dent from 1961 to 1964, Oliver D. Schreiner (1890–1980), had been, prior to his
retirement, amongst South Africa’s most distinguished jurists who, as a judge of
appeal, had been passed over twice for the chief justiceship. Considering his
refusal in the 1950s to endorse the disenfranchising of ‘coloured voters’ in the
Cape, he ‘was clearly regarded as politically unsafe by the Nationalist govern-
ment’.107 Schreiner, describing in 1961 the risks of a ‘composite nation’ consist-
ing of several nationalities with varying degrees of loyalty to the state, was aware
of the possibility of ‘the state breaking up’, like ‘Austria-Hungary’ after 1918.
Even though ‘partition agreements’ were preferable to ‘liquidation by battle’,
such a ‘division of an established state […] is a desperate remedy, […] it con-
fesses failure’.108 Clearly Schreiner’s preferences lay elsewhere when looking
for a ‘“U” turn’, an alternative to the despised apartheid system. With regard
to the Bantustan policy, Schreiner, in his 1962 presidential address to the
SAIRR entitled ‘Realism in Race Relations’, pointed to the questions left open
for debate by the National Party: ‘whether, for instance, there would eventually
be African states inside our existing boundaries, with their […] armed forces
[…] and customs barriers […], and with the right to make treaties with other
countries’.109 In ‘South Africa – United or Divided’ (1964), Schreiner empha-
sised that the ‘Bantustan policy […] bears no relation to what would be a fair
103. van den Berghe, South Africa, 117.
104. van den Berghe, South Africa, 125.
105. van den Berghe, South Africa, 148, 158.
106. See H. Suzman, In No Uncertain Terms: A South African Memoir (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 15.
107. S.D. Girvin, ‘The Architects of the Mixed Legal System’, in R. Zimmermann and D.P. Visser, eds,
Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), 132;
see E. Kahn, ‘Oliver Deneys Schreiner: The Man and his Judicial World’, South African Legal
Journal, 97 (1980), 574.
108. O.D. Schreiner, ‘Building Real Nationhood in South Africa’, Optima (London), 11 (1961), 127.
109. O.D. Schreiner, ‘Political Power in South Africa’, in P.J.M. McEwan and R.B. Sutcliffe, eds, The Study of
Africa (London: Methuen, 1965), 230, 237; O.D. Schreiner, Realism in Race Relations (Johannesburg:
South African Institute of Race Relations, 1962), 6.
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method of dividing the country between the groups.’ He argued for a general
franchise and equality for all and openly ridiculed the ‘Bantustan’ elections:
for him it did not matter if the ballot papers there would be ‘dropped into a
well’ or in the ballot box.110 Only in passing did Schreiner refer to what his pre-
decessor Hoernlé had described as ‘the liberal’s choice’111: ‘A system of partition
would not necessarily be a sham.’ But, like others, Schreiner considered par-
tition, if it were to achieve equality and fairness, ‘politically and economically
impossible [because] […] we are so well mixed up that there is no possibility
of sorting us out’.112
Nic J. Rhoodie (b. 1932), a Ph.D. student of sociologist Geoff Cronjé – ‘one of
the chief ideologues of apartheid’113 – did not concern himself with these con-
crete challenges when he spoke of South Africa’s possible ‘radical geo-political
partition’ in his Ph.D. thesis (1965) on apartheid and racial partnership.
Replete with apartheid apologetics and terminology, his chapter on ‘separate
development and geo-political partition’ can be read as an attempt to include
the thinking about ‘partition’ into an apartheid narrative about the future of
South Africa and its Bantustans.114 In more than one way Rhoodie tried to
present a counter-narrative to van den Berghe, who had offered a quote of Dr
Verwoerd of 1951 as a clear indication that the South African government
had never envisaged to create ‘independent States’ out of the present South
Africa. Rhoodie, on the other hand, quoted Verwoerd from 1964 when he pro-
pagated the future ‘independence’ of ‘our Bantu territories’. But most of all, this
piece was a ‘Sauer report-reloaded’ that showed Nic Rhoodie, similar to his
brother Eschel (later to be disgraced in the Muldergate scandal), as an academi-
cally sophisticated defender of apartheid and ‘ethnogenesis’. From the self-
confidence of Rhoodie’s assumption that ‘South Africa’s policy of separate free-
doms […] will in the course of time crystallise in […] the geopolitical separation
of White and Bantu interests’ and territories, the contemporary context can be
clearly discerned: the early days of John Vorster’s premiership have been termed
by historians as the ‘golden age for the white polity’ when economic growth ‘was
rampant’.115 Correspondingly, Rhoodie left African aspirations for self-determi-
nation at the mercy of the National Party, whose politicians had already for a
110. O.D. Schreiner, ‘South Africa – United or Divided’, in O.D. Schreiner, The Nettle: Political Power and
Race Relations in South Africa (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1964), 85.
111. Hoernlé, South African Native Policy, 181.
112. Schreiner, ‘South Africa – United or Divided’, 87.
113. C. Marx, Oxwagon Sentinel: Radical Afrikaner Nationalism and the History of the Ossewabrandwag
(Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2008), 126; but see also Giliomee who emphasises that Cronjé was not an ‘influential
figure’; Giliomee, The Afrikaners, 471.
114. N.J. Rhoodie, ‘n Rasse-sosiologiese Ontleding van Afsonderlike Volksontwikkeling en Partnership, met
besondere Verwysing na die Motiewe vir hierdie Beleidsisteme’ (D.Phil. thesis, University of Pretoria,
Pretoria, 1965).
115. J. Miller,An African Volk: The Apartheid Regime and Its Search for Survival (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2016), 2; S. Dubow, ‘Racial irredentism, ethnogenesis, and white supremacy in high-apartheid
South Africa’, Kronos 41, 1 (2015), 236.
NEGOTIATED PARTITION OF SOUTH AFRICA – AN IDEA AND ITS HISTORY (1920s–1980s) 17
long time intended including ‘the British protectorates’ (Botswana, Lesotho,
Swaziland) into any territorial reorganisation of the sub-continent. The creation
of ‘Bantu South Africa’ would thus have to include the former British territories
and South Africa’s homelands, resulting in a territory that ‘will eventually com-
prise a surface area at least equal to that of White South Africa’ (an argument
which the Fagan report had already referred to as useless for solving the ‘issue
of migrant workers’). Rhoodie’s understanding of ‘partition’ ‘elicited considerable
interest in political and academic circles’, as the author proudly explained in the
English edition of his book (published in 1969). Rhoodie reminisced on reactions
from NPmembers who indicated openness. Further ‘support’ came from journal-
ists, ‘provided [partition] could be equitably implemented […] [Following the
English edition,] a group of English-speaking South Africans held a symposium
in Durban during which the merits of, and the motives for, radical geo-political
partition were discussed’.116
However, it would require other proposals, also from abroad, for a more equi-
table territorial solution to be weighted and considered a feasible way out of the
South African impasse.
Academic ‘realism’ in drawing the line? Tiryakian’s ‘Partition for
South Africa (1967)’
Even though it has been argued that ‘Hoernlé’s idea that racial [total] separation
might be compatible with liberalism did not find much favour internation-
ally’,117 the previously mentioned works, also written by non-South Africans,
show otherwise. At least one American academic turned favourably to the
idea of an equitable partition of South Africa into two viable autonomous
states. Associate professor of sociology at Duke University, Edward Tiryakian
(b. 1929), who had early on developed an interest in South African matters, tra-
velled several times to the country to ‘gather materials’.118 In his ‘realistic socio-
logical appraisal’ of the state of affairs, he concluded in 1967 that a partition
‘may be the optimal solution’.119 Thirty years earlier, Hoernlé had apparently
‘never […] thought of “Total Separation” as a practical possibility’.120 Tiryakian,
on the other hand, considered the practical aspects of partition plans in particu-
lar and at length. This opposing point of view might be one reason why Tirya-
kian decided to never refer to Hoernlé, even though it seems unlikely that he did
not take notice of South African Native Policy and the Liberal Spirit.
116. Rhoodie, Apartheid and Racial Partnership, 357–360.
117. Rich, Hope and Despair, 62.
118. Tiryakian, ‘Apartheid and Politics’, 682.
119. Tiryakian, ‘Sociological Realism’, 208–209; see Pennsylvania State University, Eberly Family Special
Collections Library, Historical Collections and Labor Archives, Edward A. Tiryakian Papers, 1881–
2011 (6521), ‘Partition for South Africa 1967, 1965–1968’, Box 9, Folder 5.
120. Bernasconi, ‘The Paradox of Liberal Politics’, 175, 177.
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Tiryakian aimed at presenting an alternative to the dystopic perspectives on
South Africa of ‘[m]ost sociologists’ and of van der Berghe in particular – who,
as he saw it, allegedly predicted ‘that the only outcome to the South African situ-
ation is a revolutionary holocaust’. Discussing a number of ‘possibilities’ ven-
tured so far for South Africa, ranging ‘from the ideological far right to its
polar extreme’, Tiryakian aimed at showing how they ‘are either unfeasible,
impractical, or morally unacceptable’. With reference to contemporary chal-
lenges to coexistence in Canada, Belgium, and Cyprus (‘still bitterly divided
along ethnic-cultural lines’), Tiryakian excluded the possibility of a ‘successful
policy of racial-cultural integration in South Africa’. Given the ‘fate of the
Asiatic minority in East Africa’, he assumed that under ‘black dominance’,
through the ‘one-man, one-vote’ principle, ‘alien races [would be excluded]
from decision-making functions in political processes.’121 Five years after Alger-
ian independence, this case loomed large in Tiryakian’s argumentation. He
asked what would be the consequence of an ‘Algerian-type situation’,
meaning an ‘all-out war of liberation’: ‘[C]ould a prolonged war lead to the Eur-
opeans being “driven into the sea” […] that is, to their voluntary migrating away
from South Africa after defeat?’ ‘Again, the outcome of the Algerian war would
seem to suggest this possibility.’ However, whilst Tiryakian considered it ‘con-
ceivable’ that the English-speaking community might ‘“return” to their “home-
lands”,’ just as other minorities ‘(e.g. Israel, Greece)’, he deemed it ‘unlikely that
the Afrikaners would “rather switch than fight”’. He spoke of the ‘wishful think-
ing expressed in some quarters that everything would be amicably settled if only
the Afrikaners could be persuaded to leave South Africa’. Finally, the ‘extermi-
nation of the whites’ would be unacceptable ‘to the West’. Therefore, Tiryakian
warned of the consequences of a ‘racial war’, which ‘should give pause to those
who see a blood bath as a necessary catharsis for purifying the South African
atmosphere’.122
Given these ‘unfeasible’ alternatives, Tiryakian considered the partition of
South Africa the ‘inevitable answer’ and opened his argumentation with quota-
tions from the above-mentioned works of Spooner, Cowen, Giniewski, and
Schreiner, published just a few years before; thus illustrating that ‘South
African liberals have had to recognize grudgingly that partition is the only sol-
ution.’Whilst there had been several commissions since 1910 in South Africa to
investigate ‘race relations’ and ‘some form of territorial segregation’, no com-
mission ‘has ever been appointed to examine the feasibility of partition’.123 A
number of questions was thus open: ‘What would the partition of South
Africa look like? What would be the major consequences of partition?’ Would
Africans ‘also reject partitions’ the same way they rejected segregation? As
121. Tiryakian, ‘Sociological Realism’, 208, 214, 212.
122. Tiryakian, ‘Sociological Realism’, 213.
123. Tiryakian, ‘Sociological Realism’, 214, 217.
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mentioned, van den Berghe had predicted they would ‘not settle for anything
less than control over the entire country’.124 Tiryakian, however, pointed to
‘the absence of public opinion polls of urban Africans’ and was of the
‘opinion that a great majority [of (urban?) Africans] would endorse’ Jabavu’s
demand for ‘a separate state of our own’. Unfortunately he left open why he
was of this opinion.125
Tiryakian was confident about ‘sketch[ing] a tentative proposal’ for a par-
tition of South Africa into two new states, ‘viable economically and politically’.
He presented a map that showed the dividing borderline as follows:
On the one hand a ‘black’ state composed of the bulk of the Transvaal, Natal, Lesotho
and Swaziland […] On the other hand, there would be a ‘white’ republic consisting of
the Orange Free State and the Cape Province […] the Transkei and perhaps the Ciskei
could be detached from the Cape, thereby restoring the older historical boundaries
between whites and Africans back to the Kei or Fish Rivers […] Conversely, the pre-
dominantly white area of the Transvaal […] (the Klerksdorp-Potchefstroom district)
including Vereeniging would remain a part of the white republic (as would Pretoria
but not Johannesburg).126
Given the sovereignty over the Witwatersrand mining area, agricultural centres
in the Transvaal, and industrial centres like Johannesburg, Durban, and East
London, the ‘African state would have a diversified economy’; this was a decisive
difference to the above-mentioned plan made by Villiers Graaff in 1960. Tirya-
kian counted on the ‘realism’ of the ‘whites’ to accept their much-shrunken
state:
If the white population were to feel that a shrunken territory would be legitimated by
black popular leaders […], if they felt there would be a place in the African sun for
their grandchildren, then we suggest that pragmatic considerations would make
them accept this difficult alternative to an Algeria- or Kenya-type all-out conflict.127
In both new states, ‘unrestricted adult suffrage would be a sine qua non for the
international acceptance of partition’. Thus, in the Cape those called ‘coloureds’
were to be given back their vote; all racially discriminatory legislation like ‘pass
laws’ was to be done away with. ‘Relocation’ for both ‘black’ and ‘white’ would
have to be encouraged, but both groups were free to stay either as ‘permanent
citizens’ or as ‘expatriates on a temporary visa’ in the ‘black’ or the ‘white-
coloured’ state.128 Also, given South Africa’s history of forced removals,129 Tir-
yakian did not envision any sort of perfect or clear-cut division based on colour;
124. Van den Berghe, South Africa, 158.
125. Tiryakian, ‘Sociological Realism’, 218.
126. Ibid.
127. Tiryakian, ‘Sociological Realism’, 219.
128. Ibid.
129. See Suzman, who argued that ‘half a million Colored and Indian families had been removed since [the
Group Area Act of 1950] […]. Compensation […] was minimal.’ Suzman, In No Uncertain Terms, 80–
81.
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the futility of which already Jabavu had stressed in 1928 with regard to many
regions of South Africa (‘the costs of buying [occupants] out of their possession
would be fabulous’). Jabavu thus had concluded ‘that territorial segregation on
the model of Basutoland [a small and densely populated territory exclusively for
blacks who were expected to work for whites nearby across the ‘border’] is an
absolute impossibility in the Union’.130
Viability, economic and political, was decisive for the maintenance of inde-
pendence of both states after partition. The ‘partition could be supervised by
the United Nations with a period of five or ten years given for relocation.’ Tir-
yakian did not believe in ‘a last-ditch liberal argument’ and talk about ‘deep
feeling of racial good will’ as a basis for coexistence. This he considered
‘wishful thinking’ that had to face the reality of the ‘damage done to race
relations by past white oppression’. Therefore, upon his return from South
Africa Tiryakian summarised his impressions of the ‘urban African’ as
‘craving for emancipation, for being one’s own boss in one’s own country’.131
These concerns ‘for being one’s own boss in one’s own country’ were also
taken up in other studies that sought for ‘a way out of the South African
dilemma’: Multistan (1974), by Paul N. Malherbe (b. 1927), was but one of
several plans advanced in the 1970s ‘for multiracial, bottom-up cooperation’.132
At the outset he asked: ‘Are there persons today – politically sophisticated
persons – who support apartheid because they believe it can succeed?’133
Even before the Soweto uprising this was more than a rhetorical question
and, in its sense of crisis and unavoidable change, far away from the brash confi-
dence in the future of the apartheid order exhibited by Rhoodie and others
barely five years earlier. Multistan was a plan for a unified area with a
common roll irrespective of ethnicity (contrary to the Bantustans) that
formed part of a South African federation composed of mainly ‘white’ and
‘black states’. Malherbe was thus not advancing a sort of two-state solution
but asked for smaller administrative units bound in a federal system – not
unlike the concept of a South African Federation promoted by Gatsha Mango-
suthu Buthelezi (b. 1928), then leader of the KwaZulu territorial authority.134
For Malherbe, KwaZulu (he still spoke of Zululand) was ‘a Multistan Prototype’
for which, to succeed politically and economically, it was however necessary to
include the property of ‘white land-owners’, who were to retain their land under
a common roll (evidently dominated by ‘Zulu voters’) and equal rights.135 This
way, as former liberal senator for Zululand, Edgar Brookes (1897–1979),
130. Jabavu, The Segregation Fallacy, 4, 7.
131. Tiryakian, ‘Sociological Realism’, 220–221.
132. Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa?, 145.
133. P.N. Malherbe,Multistan: A Way Out of the South African Dilemma (Cape Town: David Philip, 1974), 1.
134. G.M. Buthelezi, ‘Mein Konzept einer südafrikanischen Föderation’, Internationales Afrika-Forum, 10,
2–3 (1974), 118–122 (translated and introduced by Klaus von der Ropp).
135. Malherbe, Multistan, 37.
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summarised in a positive review, ‘white residents can remain political sharers in
Kwa Zulu without humiliation’. If the Kwa Zulu example succeeded, this would
convert whites in other South African regions ‘to the view that a black majority
can rule whites without economic, political or personal disaster’.136
Making international headlines: the maps of Blenck and Ropp (1976)
Opposition parliamentarian Suzman called the political correspondents in Cape
Town her ‘most helpful allies’. In her memoirs she brought to mind ‘foreign cor-
respondents from overseas papers whose support gave me great encouragement
in my more despairing moments’. The coverage of South African politics by
New York Times journalist Joseph Lelyveld (b. 1937) was particularly relevant
in this respect.137 And the New York Times also played a major role in dissemi-
nating the idea of ‘negotiated partition’ of South Africa to an international audi-
ence. No less a journalistic authority than Cyrus L. Sulzberger (1912–1993),
former lead foreign correspondent of the newspaper, pointed in 1977 to the
‘negotiate[d] territorial partition’ of South Africa. For Sulzberger this was a
way of ‘Eluding the Last Ditch’, which encompassed, for him, the prospect of
‘widespread war’ – and for this end he referred to an ‘interesting’ study by
Jürgen Blenck and Klaus von der Ropp.138
Both the geographer Blenck (1938–2016) and the lawyer von der Ropp (b.
1938), working for the think tank Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, were right-
fully characterised by Sulzberger as ‘African specialist[s]’.139 They had widely
published on the current affairs of the continent and in 1976 had jointly pub-
lished in the German foreign affairs review Aussenpolitik (Hamburg) a study
on the partition of South Africa.140 The following year the piece was translated
into English and published in South Africa under the title ‘Republic of South
Africa: Is Partition a Solution?’141 Over the following years von der Ropp con-
tinued to discuss these proposals, which were the most elaborated hitherto, not
only in German and English publications but also in French, Dutch, Australian,
and Mexican journals.
Based on the contemporary context (partitions from Ireland to Cyprus), two
tenets were important for the argumentation at the outset: first, the notion of the
136. E. Brookes, ‘“Multistan”: A New Factor’, review of P.N. Malherbe, ‘Multistan’: A Way Out of the South
African Dilemma (Cape Town: David Philip, 1974), Reality, 6, 5 (1974), 16.
137. Suzman, In No Uncertain Terms, 133; see J. Lelyveld,Move Your Shadow: South Africa, Black andWhite
(New York: Crown, 1985).
138. C.L. Sulzberger, ‘Staying Out of the Last Ditch’, International Herald Tribune, 10 August 1977, 4; also
published as under the title ‘Eluding the Last Ditch’, New York Times, 10 August 1977.
139. Sulzberger, ‘Staying Out of the Last Ditch’, 4.
140. J. Blenck and K. von der Ropp, ‘Republik von Südafrika: Teilung als Ausweg?’, Aussenpolitik, 27, 3
(1976), 308–324.
141. J. Blenck and K. von der Ropp, ‘Republic of South Africa: Is Partition a Solution?’, South African
Journal of African Affairs, 7, 1 (1977), 21–32.
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historicity of plans for an equitable partition of South Africa, strengthened by
the observation that the ‘advocates of this type of solution have been recently
been speaking out more frequently’;142 second, the assumption of irreconcilably
opposing views, animosity, mutual fear, and conflict of interests of white and
black South Africans. Already three years earlier von der Ropp had quoted a
statement that Anglican Bishop Gonville ffrench-Beytagh (1913–1991), expelled
from South Africa for subversive activity against the state, had declared in Bonn,
West-Germany: ‘an integrated society can only be realized in heaven, not in
South Africa.’143 Consequently, Blenck and von der Ropp described the par-
tition of South Africa as the only alternative ‘[i]f a racially integrated society
were to remain an illusion’.144
Their proposal for partition, illustrated by two often reprinted maps, con-
tained the following elements: South Africa is to be partitioned into two
states (‘Black’ in the east, ‘White, Coloured and Indian’ in the west) along a
border that runs from Sishen over Kimberley and Bloemfontein to Port Elisa-
beth. In both states the one man, one vote principle is to apply. This border
takes into account historical and economic factors that aim at fairness and
equal development potential in order to ensure the viability and independence
of both states. The eastern, ‘Black’ state would have at its disposal over about 50
per cent of the territory of South Africa with 70 per cent of the total population
and about 75 per cent of the gross national product, including, contrary to Tir-
yakian’s plan, all goldmines and the Johannesburg/Pretoria industrial centre.
Each state would have three major port cities. Major population movements
were foreseen, ‘in which contrary to separation policy until now White and
Asian Africans would be most affected. In all some 4.6 million were to be
resettled.’ Given these staggering numbers, the authors emphasised that this
partition ‘would only represent a viable solution if it remains the only alternative
to years of bloodshed’. In order to assure the White minority of the durability of
this solution, the West was to guarantee the existence of a smaller, western state
by offering membership in the Western defence community. Both, the western
and the eastern South African state, were to be provided with extensive Western
economic aid, ‘comparable to the Marshall Plan’.145
Already in 1976 this proposal drew considerable attention from South
African and German newspapers – the Soweto Uprising and the independence
of neighbouring Angola and Mozambique caused an upsurge in international
142. Blenck and von der Ropp, ‘Republic of South Africa”, 25.
143. ‘Eine integrierte Gesellschaftsordnung sei nur im Himmel, nicht aber in Südafrika zu verwirklichen.’
K. von der Ropp, ‘Simplifizierungen?’ [letter to the editor], Afrika heute, May (1973), 54; see also
K. von der Ropp, ‘Südafrika muss geteilt werden’ [letter to the editor], Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, 289, 13 December 1974, 10.
144. Blenck and von der Ropp, ‘Republic of South Africa”, 25.
145. K. von der Ropp, ‘Is Territorial Partition a Strategy for Peaceful Change in South Africa?’, International
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awareness of the urgency to find alternatives to apartheid acceptable to both
parties. As historian Jamie Miller remarks: ‘These years [1974-76] marked
[…] the crossroad for the apartheid order.’146
Where Sulzberger soberly noted, ‘[s]uch a surgical operation would be cruel’,
others expressed their ‘doubts’ and ‘pessimism concerning the readiness’ of the
parties to the conflict to divide ‘their country’.147 Given the rejection by the NP
government of the one man, one vote principle and the Soweto uprising, it even
seemed possible that partition would only be executed once open war had
broken out and the ‘whites’ were forced to take refuge in the southern Capeland,
thus making partition a fallback plan and a reality only after bloodshed, as in
most similar cases throughout the twentieth century.148 A former German
ambassador to South Africa called partition a ‘radical solution out of despera-
tion’.149 Ten years earlier, Tiryakian had already admitted apodictically that
‘partition goes counter to liberal ideas of integration’.150 And a later analyst
noted, also with reference to the unclear solution of intergroup conflicts
between Whites, Indians, and Coloureds: ‘Partition cannot be ruled out, but it
is not a promising idea.’151 In the following years, other proposals were tabled
according to which, for example, ‘the entire present appearance of the Republic
of South Africa will be radically changed by manipulation of internal borders’
and ‘adjustments to few external frontiers’. However, such attempts, arguing
with ‘natural regions’ and complaining about ‘arbitrary geopolical borders’,
appeared more like a benign Bantustan policy, hoping to give away these
‘black states’ by ‘incorporating’ them with Lesotho or Botswana (‘amalgama-
tion’), whilst still imagining the largest parts of South Africa as ‘White
country’.152
Yet, considering South Africa’s worsening political and human rights situ-
ation in the late 1970s, European politicians became more involved in debates
about concrete alternatives to apartheid. In Germany, for example, the Social
Democrat Egon Bahr (1922–2015), until 1976 minister of economic cooperation
and an éminence grise of German politics, took a special interest in southern
Africa. In a newspaper interview in July 1977, he spoke not only about the
future of Namibia but also about South Africa. The interview clearly showed
how the idea of ‘negotiated partition’ of South Africa had reached beyond
146. Miller, An African Volk, 2.
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seldorf: Econ, 1978), 68. On ambassador Sonnenhol (1968–1972), see S. Schrafstetter, ‘ANazi Diplomat
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academic circles. Rejecting for South Africa the ‘simple propagation of the “one
man, one vote” principle’, Bahr emphasised the necessity to find a
settlement that links the coexistence of Black and White with the security of the rights
of both races. The ‘easiest’ arrangement of such problems in world history was parti-
tioning. This cannot work in South Africa. Thus, we need a hitherto unknown model
of equitable cohabitation with a special protection for minorities.153
In South Africa, then leader of the Progressive Federal Party van Zyl Slabbert, in
his sober assessment of South Africa’s Options (1979), took note of Blenck and
Ropp’s ‘radical and equitable suggestion’ and considered it ‘morally quite defen-
sible’. Yet he cautioned that ‘quite likely the line [of partition] will be drawn
where the battle has ended’.154
This dystopian consideration of the partition option was, however, not the
end of the discussion. In 1980 the economist Gavin Maasdorp (b. 1937) col-
lected several of the ‘forms of partition’ discussed so far, including those that
clearly fell within the orbit of apartheid measures, like the infamous Eiselen
line of 1955.155 From the late 1970s even the NP government launched
studies into potential constitutional reforms for South Africa that included a
geographical reordering of power. Prime Minister P. W. Botha (1916-2006),
in his Twelve-Point Plan of 1979, set as a policy objective:
(3) The creation by the Black nations of constitutional structures giving them the great-
est possible degree of self-government within states which are consolidated as far as
possible. We believe that part of the right to self-determination of these Black states is
to allow them to grow towards independence according to their own judgement.156
In the words of political scientist Deon Geldenhuys (b. 1950), the plan ‘represent
[ed] the lowest common denominator’ within the NP. However, this party pos-
ition on the future of the ‘homelands’ was not only a mere continuation of the
policy since the 1960s – and thus a far cry from the above-quoted ideas about
‘negotiated partition’ put forward by academics and journalists (thus indicating
the limited impact of these authors) – but ‘international opinion [also] rejects
the balkanisation of South Africa into separate black homelands and the grant-
ing of independence to them.’157
Whereas Prime Minister Botha rejected notions of ‘negotiated partition’ and
remained intransigent towards a federal or consociational future of South
Africa, others in his party, namely Piet Koornhof (1925–2007), Minister of
153. E. Bahr, ‘Ohne Verhandlungslösung ist die Gefahr eines dritten Weltkrieges ständig gegenwärtig’,
Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, 28, 10 July 1977, 8.
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with Particular Reference to the ‘12-Point Plan’ (Johannesburg: South African Institute for International
Affairs, 1981), 60.
157. Geldenhuys, Some Foreign Policy Implications, 11, 14; see also Geldenhuys, ‘South Africa’s Black
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Co-operation and Development (formerly known as ‘Bantu Affairs’ [1978–
1984]), ‘one of the “reforming”ministers’ in Botha’s government,158 considered
for several years options of a ‘canton system’ based on the ‘Swiss model’ – an
indirect impact of Malherbe’s Multistan ideas seems likely here.159 Throughout
the 1980s such a ‘geographically and ethnically based federal/confederal order
for South Africa’was discussed by politicians, who were aware that the introduc-
tion of the tricameral system in 1984, which created coloured and Indian
‘houses’ in Parliament in parallel to the whites-only House of Assembly, was
an insufficient reform. Contemporary observers spoke of ‘a long series of specu-
lations about this issue’ and ‘evolving constitutional plans’ of the ruling party,
but also of academics and others who were eager to present a constitutional
alternative to the impasse Botha’s insistence on the ‘homelands’ (and thus the
rejection of ‘South African’ citizenship for their inhabitants) had created. 160
However, to the main opposition all this talk about federal or cantonal
systems (politicians did not discuss a negotiated partition) was the wrong
‘alternative’, because the old tragedy described 60 years earlier by Jabavu
remained unresolved: white politicians held the power to ‘confine the black
man within such circumscribed limits that he should never be territorially inde-
pendent.’161 Within the ANC it seemed clear that the intended ‘liberation’ was
meant to include all of the South African territory – just as van den Berghe had
predicted 20 years earlier. Also, Geldenhuys pointed out in 1981 that the ‘home-
lands policy has discredited the notion of territorial separation in the eyes of the
majority of blacks in South Africa’.162 The ANC’s Govan Mbeki (1910–2001)
told a British audience in the mid-1980s that his party disliked a ‘federal struc-
ture’ that would mirror the ‘bantustans’; rather, he stated, ‘we are saying a
united, democratic and non-racial South Africa.’163
Conclusion
In 1969 Rhoodie suggested that ‘the advantages and disadvantages of radical
geo-political partition will increasingly become the subject matter of aca-
demic and political discussion.’164 This projection turned out to be true,
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as the discussion above has shown. What has become equally clear is that the
meaning of ‘partition’ of South Africa remained disputed amongst authors
and that it changed over time. To give one last example, the editor of Die
Transvaaler, G.D. Scholtz (1905-1983) – an ardent nationalist hagiographer
of Afrikaner leaders who was despised by professional university historians –
proposed his own definition of ‘partition’ because of his opposition to the
term ‘apartheid’, stylising in the 1960s and 1970s ‘“partition” to be the
seminal concept of Afrikaner political thought’.165 Be this as it may,
others thought of ‘partition’ as a political solution to a moral, social, and
economic catastrophe that, under the term ‘apartheid’, had been turned
into a ‘hegemonic ideology’ which ‘had achieved broad support in white
society’.166 Considering that there were Afrikaner voices heard in the discus-
sion about ‘partition’, it is to be noted that these critical voices attest to the
heterogeneity of the Afrikaner community, parts of which expressed their
‘own discomfort with apartheid’.167
Whereas authors opposed to partition plans tried to disqualify any thought
about dividing the country in two by claiming that it was the architects of
apartheid who had ‘original partition aims’ once the Bantustans were econ-
omically self-sufficient and could accommodate all Africans,168 the maps pro-
duced by researchers giving the greater part of national wealth, including the
Rand, to black Africans, indicate that ‘partition’ could be defined very differ-
ently. Evidently, besides the model of two independent states, others were
discussed as future alternatives to apartheid; there was, as Geldenhuys put
it, ‘a range of scenarios’, from dismemberment (including ‘radical territorial
partition’) to reintegration (of South Africa as a ‘unitary state’).169 Given this
plethora of suggested options and ‘plan[s] for the future’, an American
scholar characterised South Africa as a ‘real graveyard of social science
prophecies’.170
Counter-factual questions about the prospects of a negotiated partition of
South Africa becoming a reality at different times need not be discussed
here. However, where did the thinking about partition come from? Two
considerations – one domestic and one on foreign policy – are particularly
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relevant here: When speaking about a ‘predominantly black’ and a ‘predomi-
nantly white’ state to be created through a negotiated partition of South
Africa, authors like Jan Graaff and others have assumed since 1960, first,
that people would know where they belonged; and, second, that an exact
definition of the meaning of ‘black’ and ‘white’ was – contrary to the absurd-
ities of apartheid legislation and practice – unnecessary. After all, historians
were at the same time busy to historicise (thus, to problematise) the ‘emer-
gence’ of Afrikaners and the ‘construction’ and ‘development of the Afrika-
ner self-concept’.171 However, the existence of a plurality of groups in South
Africa, each having their own identity, their ‘culture’, which was in need of
protection, was a matter of course for the authors discussed here. This
assumption stood at the baseline of their arguments for some form of
partition.172
Furthermore, the international context of world politics and historical pre-
cedents did play a decisive role. During the Cold War era, seeing the world as
bi-polar and thinking in ideological camps that were impossible to reconcile
was nothing unusual. And it sufficed to look at any world map printed
around 1970 to see the geopolitical results of this bipolarity.173 ‘This is a
century of partitions’, wrote Sulzberger when discussing Blenck and Ropp’s pro-
posal: ‘Ireland, India, Palestine, Germany, Korea, Vietnam. None has worked
well; but mankind favors “war tomorrow” over “war today”.’174 The proposals
discussed here were all destined to avoid war altogether – they offered
conflict regulation in a plural society through partition. For liberals this was tan-
tamount to an ‘abject failure’ of the South African society in the assumption that
‘whites and non-whites simply cannot live together in peace’.175 Beginning with
Jabavu and Hoernlé, ‘partition’ was seen as a political means of protecting blacks
from white domination – and reducing the risk of subsequent revolt and revo-
lution that may, in turn, have led to the overthrow of the white minority regime
and to black domination. Partition was then a third option between the two
poles of domination, to be preferred for reasons of peace.
171. A. du Toit, ‘“Afrikaander circa 1600”: Reflections and Suggestions Regarding the Origins and Fate of
Afrikaner Nationalism’, South African Historical Journal, 60, 4 (2008), 563. This refers to A. du Toit
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H. Giliomee, Afrikaner Political Thought, Analysis and Documents, Vol. 1, 1780–1850 (Cape Town:
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However, the converse was also conceivable. That partition would be pre-
ceded by an outright war, as Van Zyl Slabbert believed, was not an unreasonable
assumption. Thus, partition was also a fallback option. After all, already in 1960
Kwame Nkrumah warned of the risk that, in South Africa, ‘a revolution of des-
peration creates another Algeria on our continent.’176 In the late 1970s ‘many
observers’ envisaged ‘in South Africa a protracted but ultimately successful
war of African liberation’.177 Contemporaries viewed ‘multiracialism’ in South
Africa as unrealistic, ‘except after an upheaval on the scale of the American
Civil War.’ Others even put their hope in ‘outside intervention amounting
[…] to an act of war’ against South Africa.178 The involvement of the Soviet
Union in southern Africa was most evident since the beginning of the
Angolan civil war, and the ANC was believed to be thoroughly in the Soviet
camp. In case open conflict had broken out (with Soviet support) inside
South Africa, a (literal) east-west division of the country could have offered
(at least for a period of time) a compromise, similar to Korea, Vietnam, or
Yemen. Partition, then, was close to a worst-case scenario, to be avoided by poli-
ticians at all cost.
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